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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
Buan-,N op Paoop.-The case of Rowe, Adin.. v. Colorado and Southern
R. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App. i918), 2o5 S. W. 731, is typical of the confusion
all too common in the use of this term "burden of proof".
Mrs. Rowe, as administratrix of her deceased husband, brings her action
to recover against the Railroad Company, for the benefit of herself, as widow
of deceased, and their minor children, for the injury resulting from the
death of her husband, upon the theory that the death was caused by the
negligence of the defendant companies.
The negligence charged was defective condition of a car loaded with coal,
and absence of proper inspection which would have discovered the defect.
The court of Civil Appeals, in an opinion granting a new trial upon the appli-
cation of the plaintiff, uses the language following: "The question of
whether or not the car was inspected before being placed in charge of the
train crew, was a fact lying peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellees,
(Railroad Company), and the burden of proving it rested on them". It is a
real misfortune that the use of this term "burden of proof" in legal discus-
sion can not be confined to a single legal concept embodying a definite legal
principle. One had reason to expect that the mass of enlightening discussion
of this question in recent years would find its reflection in the opinions of
the courts of last resort. It is still difficult to discover that it has had any
marked effect. We still can find many illustrations of its use in very differ-
ent senses.
It is not clear in what sense the court used the term in the case under
discussion. Did the court in its use of the term mean that if there were no
evidence offered by either party from which it could be determined whether
or not the car was inspected, that the jury should be advised that it should
find that it was not inspected because the burden was on the defendants to
prove inspection? Or, if evidence were offered by both parties on this issue,
did the court intend by what it said, to indicate that if the jury were to find
such evidence so evenly balanced as that it could not tell where the prepon-
derance did lie, it would be the duty of the jury to find that there was no
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inspection because the defendants had failed to lift the burden which was
theirs? If such be the meaning of what the court says, it is a declaration
that the jury is to determine that the defendants are liable in plaintiff's action
for negligent injury although it is unable to find they were guilty of the
negligence charged. In the clause immediately following the one quoted
the court goes on to state that the plaintiff did introduce evidence from which
the jury would be justified in concluding that the car was not inspected.
It must be concluded then that the court does not use the term "burden
of proof", as indicating the obligation which a party to civil litigation takes
upon himself to establish those facts essential to his cause of action or affirm-
ative defense, by a preponderance of evidence, or be defeated of his cause
of action or defense. As already indicated, it is difficult to attach any defi-
nite meaning to the words as used in the opinion in this case. Apparently
the court is saying that some legal effect in the field of evidence is to be
given to the fact that the means of proof of a particular fact are more
accessible to one party than to the other. But what legal effect? Is it more
than that the jury would be justified in taking something against a party
shown to be in possession of evidence if he shall fail to produce it?
Because no one may know so well as the defendant whether he be guilty
of the murder charged against him, are we to say that he shall have the
burden of showing that he is innocent? Are we to say that because no one
knows so well as the defendant whether he is the author of a libellous pub-
lication, that he is to be found guilty though no evidence be produced against
him? No more is it true that because no one may know so well as the
defendant whether he inspected a car wheel on a particular occasion, in an
action charging him with that failure and depending upon proof of that fact,
it is to be found that he did not inspect it though no evidence be produced
upon the question.
It may well be said, that if there is evidence upon the question, that the
fact that the defendants are shown to be in better position than the plaintiffs
to know whether there was inspection and to produce evidence of it, a fail-
ure on their part to do so might be considered by the jury, with the other
evidence, in determining whether there was, or was not inspection. In other
words the instruction might, under such circumstanoes, be justified, that the
jury might find there was no inspection upon evidence having less probative
value than would be justifiable if the contested fact were not one, the evi-
dence of which was peculiarly within the knowledge and control of the de-
fendants.
Let us not give over pleading for the recognition, in all authoritative dec-
larations of law, of a single definite meaning for the term "burden of proof".
It would be a real service to procedural law if so desirable a result could
be accomplished.
As previously indicated, that meaning of the term most nearly correct
theoretically, and best supported upon authority, is one making it stand for
the legal concept that parties in civil cases must establish their causes of
action or defenses by a preponderance of the evidence; that an affirmative
defense of a defendant in a criminal case must be established under the
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same rule, and that the State must establish the facts essential to the guilt
of the crime charged by evidence which satisfies the jury beyond any rea-
sonable doubt.
The case of Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N. H. 553, well illustrates a discriminat-
ing use of the term. Excellent discussions upon principle and authority can
be found in Thayer's Preliminary Evidence at the Common Law, p. 353, and
in Wigmore's Evidence, §§ 2483 et seq. V. H. L.
